By Murat Yıldız
On November 4, 2026, survivors and relatives of victims of the Filo Jet ferry disaster filed a criminal complaint in Mersin, seeking an examination of the vessel's business connections, maintenance history and safety oversight in Türkiye. The filing comes as parliamentary answers from Türkiye's Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure confirm that the passenger catamaran underwent three port state control inspections before sinking off Kyrenia on August 30.
The vessel sank shortly after departing for Taşucu. More than two months later, three-year-old Anni Asel Hilaloğlu remains missing.
The ministry also confirmed that Filo Jet had received time-limited approvals for services between Türkiye and Kyrenia. Its most recent technical checks identified in the parliamentary responses were carried out by Türk Loydu on June 2, following a shipyard period.
The answers, provided to several members of parliament in late October, establish a record of inspections, document checks and route approvals. They provide little detail about what inspectors found or what technical evidence supported the decisions.
Those gaps have become more significant as investigators in northern Cyprus examine earlier equipment problems, maintenance work and the decisions preceding the ferry's final voyage.
Families seek examination of company links
The complaint was submitted to the Mersin Chief Public Prosecutor's Office on November 4 on behalf of survivors and relatives of those who died.
Lawyer Berkan Aydoğan called for an examination of links between Filo Gemi Acentalığı Lojistik ve Taşımacılık Ticaret Limited Şirketi in Türkiye and Filo Denizcilik in northern Cyprus, including their management, representation and ownership arrangements.
According to Aydoğan's account of the filing, the families requested scrutiny of Saim İlkılıç, whose reported corporate connections include management and representation duties in Türkiye and a shareholding in the Turkish Cypriot company, and Ahmet Dönüş, identified with management responsibilities in the Türkiye-based company.
The request also names Mehmet Can Dönüş, Ali Özdülger and Süleyman Dilek in connection with their reported shareholder or management roles at Filo Denizcilik.
Their inclusion in the complaint does not establish wrongdoing. The families are asking prosecutors to examine their respective responsibilities, alongside those of other company officials, crew members, inspectors and port authorities.
The filing brings activities in Türkiye into a case that has so far centered on the captain, crew, port officials and company representatives questioned in Kyrenia.
It also raises questions about responsibility for the vessel's maintenance, technical condition and continued operation.
The filing does not establish whether prosecutors have opened a formal investigation into each person or company mentioned.
Three inspections confirmed, findings undisclosed
Written answers from the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure to Mersin MPs Gülcan Kış and Perihan Koca Doğan confirm that Filo Jet underwent three port state control (PSC) inspections in Türkiye:
September 2, 2024
July 17, 2025
February 5, 2026
PSC inspections allow port authorities to check vessels registered under another administration's flag against applicable international maritime safety requirements.
The ministry provided the dates but did not disclose the inspection reports, specify whether deficiencies had been recorded or explain whether corrective measures were required.
The February inspection took place less than seven months before the disaster. It was followed by shipyard work and a June 2 technical inspection by Türk Loydu.
The underlying reports would show which systems were examined, whether deficiencies were identified and how any corrective action was handled. The parliamentary answers do not provide that information.
Route approvals issued for Mersin and Taşucu
The ministry confirmed that Filo Jet received time-limited suitability letters for scheduled services on the Mersin–Kyrenia and Taşucu–Kyrenia routes.
According to the answers to Kış and Koca Doğan, the letters were issued after the vessel was found to meet the relevant regulatory conditions.
The ministry did not provide their issue or expiry dates, or identify the supporting technical documents.
These approvals are separate from PSC inspections. They concern authorization to operate regular services involving ports in Türkiye, rather than the findings of an individual port inspection.
What evidence supported those approvals, and how was the vessel's technical condition assessed when they were issued or renewed?
Captain's documents checked through port system
The ministry's answer to Mersin MP Ali Bozan provides another part of the regulatory record.
It states that documents uploaded by Filo Jet's agent to the Port Management Information System (LYBS) were examined. According to that review, the vessel was crewed in accordance with a Minimum Safe Manning Document issued by the Turkish Cypriot administration.
The captain held a Honduran qualification accepted by the flag administration, together with a valid endorsement issued by the Turkish Cypriot administration recognising his Honduran certificate, according to the ministry.
The same information appears in the joint answer to three parliamentary questions submitted by Hatay MP Nermin Yıldırım Kara.
The endorsement, issued on September 26, 2025, and valid until September 26, 2026, covered the date of the sinking.
It does not, however, separately establish the craft-and-route type-rating qualification described in the 1994 International Code of Safety for High-Speed Craft (HSC Code), applicable to high-speed craft of Filo Jet's construction period.
A captain's general professional qualification and its recognition by the flag administration are separate from the additional training and certification provisions for operating a particular high-speed craft.
The ministry's answers confirm the documents it examined but leave the type-rating question unresolved. They do not establish that the captain lacked such a qualification.
Türk Loydu inspection followed shipyard period
The parliamentary responses identify June 2, 2026, as the date of Filo Jet's most recent technical checks.
The ministry said Türk Loydu carried out the inspection on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot flag administration after a shipyard period.
The vessel's class certificate also records an annual survey at Taşucu on June 2. Its scope and findings remain important to the investigation, particularly as police in Kyrenia have sought records of maintenance and repairs carried out earlier in the year.
The ministry did not disclose the survey's detailed findings or any corrective work required.
Filo Jet's Türk Loydu class certificate, numbered 2606021647557134, was issued on June 2. In a post-accident online verification check reported on September 1, its status appeared as invalid. The available record does not establish when that status changed or why.
The later status does not show that the certificate was invalid on August 30.
The full survey record, certificate history and accompanying Ship Status Report would clarify whether any technical conditions remained outstanding when the ferry returned to service.
Other vessels operated by Filo Denizcilik
A response to Mersin MP Mehmet Emin Ekmen provides information absent from the other parliamentary answers.
According to the ministry, RORO LEFKE had not operated services to Türkiye since November 24, 2025. TOROS underwent a PSC inspection on January 6, 2026, and BEŞPARMAK was inspected on June 6.
ŞAMPİYON MELEKLER was inspected twice, on July 16 and August 6.
The ministry said deficiencies identified during the inspections were rectified before the affected vessels resumed operations.
It did not identify which vessels had deficiencies, their severity or the corrective measures taken.
The information broadens the picture of the operator's inspection history in Türkiye. It does not establish that Filo Jet had similar deficiencies or that the condition of other vessels contributed to the disaster.
Ministry distinguishes flag-state and port-state roles
The parliamentary answers emphasize that Filo Jet was not registered under Türkiye's flag and that maritime casualty investigations fall under the responsibility of the flag administration.
That position concerns responsibility for investigating the sinking. It does not alter the inspection and route approval activities undertaken by authorities in Türkiye before the accident.
The ministry's joint response to Yıldırım Kara also provided broader inspection statistics. It said 153 foreign-flagged passenger vessels calling at ports in Türkiye had been inspected over five years, with 10 detained for serious deficiencies.
It reported another 231 inspections of passenger vessels registered under Türkiye's flag during 2026, as of September 25.
Those figures describe wider regulatory activity but provide no findings specific to Filo Jet.
No ministry response to a further parliamentary question, numbered 7/50408 and submitted by Istanbul MP Ayşe Sibel Yanıkömeroğlu, was available in the parliamentary records examined.
Kyrenia inquiry examines earlier equipment problems
The investigation in northern Cyprus has expanded into the vessel's maintenance history, safety equipment and operational decisions.
At an October 30 court hearing, police described recorded crew discussions involving earlier problems with steering, generators, exhaust equipment, radar and other systems.
Questions were also raised about watertight doors, passenger access arrangements, liferaft equipment and safety briefings.
Police previously told the court that the voyage data recorder had stopped recording bridge audio on August 28, two days before the sinking. No bridge audio from the final voyage was available. The reason for the interruption remains under investigation.
Defense lawyers have challenged suggestions that discussions of earlier equipment problems establish the cause of the disaster. No final technical finding has established that connection.
Additional experts, including specialists from Türkiye, have been selected to examine technical evidence.
The crew warnings and missing voyage recorder audio, along with subsequent court evidence concerning doors and liferaft equipment, have placed the vessel's earlier condition under scrutiny.
The parliamentary answers raise a further question: whether any of those concerns appeared in inspection records held by authorities in Türkiye.
No publicly established evidence currently connects the earlier PSC inspections to the equipment problems described in court.
The inspection records remain central
The sinking is being investigated in northern Cyprus, where the casualty occurred. The Mersin complaint seeks scrutiny of business activities and regulatory decisions involving Türkiye.
The proceedings have different legal foundations, but both may require examination of the vessel's operating and maintenance records.
The ministry's answers confirm three PSC inspections, two route suitability arrangements, checks of documents submitted by the vessel's agent and a June technical inspection performed by Türk Loydu for the Turkish Cypriot administration.
They leave the substance of those checks largely unexplained.
The PSC reports, route approval files, June 2 survey findings and shipyard maintenance records could establish what inspectors documented about Filo Jet's condition before August 30.
Until those records are examined, it remains unclear whether earlier safety concerns were identified during the inspections, what action followed and what technical evidence supported the vessel's continued operation.
Sources: Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure written answers to parliamentary questions 7/48555, 7/48685, 7/48965, 7/48962 and 7/49072–7/49074; parliamentary records concerning question 7/50408; Anadolu Agency, Bugün Kıbrıs and Bağımsız Gazetesi reporting on the November 4 Mersin criminal complaint; Kyrenia court proceedings and Turkish Cypriot media reports; Türk Loydu classification documents and certificate verification; International Maritime Organization, 1994 HSC Code; Bosphorus News review and reporting.