By Tuğrul Akşar | Guest Commentary
Tuğrul Akşar is a football economist, author and co-founder of the Football Economy Strategic Research Center (FESAM) and FutbolEkonomi. A graduate of Ankara University's Faculty of Political Sciences, he spent 35 years in banking and has written extensively on football finance, governance and economics.
Written exclusively for Bosphorus News. Translated from Turkish and edited by Murat Yıldız.
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When Financial Strain Becomes Institutional
Turkish football has long made headlines not for results on the pitch, but for the holes in club balance sheets, mounting debt and repeated failures of financial judgment. The situation today, however, is different from earlier financial crises. The liquidity squeeze on Borsa Istanbul and the widening investigations into investment funds are exposing the limits of a model Turkish football has sustained for years under the label of "sustainable borrowing."
Legal proceedings involving figures in club management, block sales of club shares and the losses suffered by supporters and small investors show that the problem has moved beyond finance. It has become institutional. Calling this an unfortunate episode or a temporary period of market turbulence only obscures the underlying failure.
The crisis is rooted in a model that consumes without producing, borrows instead of building equity and relies too heavily on personal networks rather than transparent institutions.
The Fund Crisis Marks the Breakdown of an Unsustainable Football System
The latest fund crisis in Turkish football and the liquidity squeeze on Borsa Istanbul are not isolated financial accidents or temporary cash shortages. They are the result of structural problems buried in club balance sheets for years and of the financial irrationality we have repeatedly warned about.
Turkish sports clubs have become trapped in an unsustainable "import and spend" model. They consume without producing, borrow without generating equity and mortgage future income to finance the present.
During this period, money obtained through investment funds gave clubs temporary relief rather than a durable financing structure. It helped administrations meet short-term cash needs. But as these commercial ties expanded, they also began placing additional pressure on already fragile club finances.
Capital inflows created short-lived momentum and helped mask persistent weaknesses in operating cash flow. The gap between expectations and financial reality can no longer be hidden.
Administrative and legal developments involving senior management should not be treated as isolated cases. They raise direct questions about oversight and transparency. Access to money is no substitute for competent management. The real challenge is how clubs manage scarce resources and how decisions are made once those resources begin to run out.
Block sales of club shares and the losses suffered by supporters and small investors are part of the social cost of this poorly institutionalized financialization. Properly designed financial instruments could have broadened ownership and distributed risk more rationally.
"The core problem in the Turkish sports economy is not simply a shortage of money. It is the model itself."
The core problem in the Turkish sports economy is not simply a shortage of money. It is the model itself. A structure that survives by selling assets and refinancing debt with more expensive debt has reached its limits. Without stronger institutions, transparency and financial discipline, today's "fund crisis" can spread across the football industry.
The Beşiktaş-Tera Network: Sponsorship or Financial Engineering?
The relationship between Beşiktaş and Tera Yatırım, viewed alongside the financing structures of Galatasaray, Trabzonspor and other Süper Lig clubs, points to something more complex than conventional sponsorship.
In a traditional sponsorship arrangement, a company provides revenue and brand support. The relationship is commercially defined and the risks are relatively clear. In today's finance-driven model, some sponsors are moving into financing, restructuring and capital-market functions. When conditions deteriorate, part of that risk can end up with small investors.
Beşiktaş's relationship with Tera Holding appears to go beyond shirt advertising or stadium naming rights. It involves financial advisory services, capital-market processes and the possibility of block share sales.
The sponsor therefore moves beyond advertising and assumes a hybrid role, part financier and part restructuring partner. This is closely connected to the wider funding problem. Clubs that cannot generate enough cash from operations increasingly try to combine sponsors, banks and intermediary institutions within the same financing structure.
But if this model fails to create operating income, it does not solve the underlying problem. It simply brings future revenue into the present.
Galatasaray and Trabzonspor offer similar warnings. High-profile transfers and large sponsorship agreements can create short-term momentum, but reliance on external funding remains. If a sponsor withdraws or financing dries up, the balance sheet comes under immediate pressure.
"In Turkish football today, the sponsor is no longer always just a revenue partner. In some cases, the sponsor has become part of the club's financial risk structure."
In Turkish football today, the sponsor is no longer always just a revenue partner. In some cases, the sponsor has become part of the club's financial risk structure.
Asset Sales and the Risk of Losing Control: The 51.22% Threshold
During the liquidity squeeze on Borsa Istanbul, Beşiktaş's decision to sell an 8.9% stake in Futbol AŞ for TL 927 million may provide temporary support to cash flow. It may reduce short-term interest pressure and ease debt servicing.
But for a business that cannot generate enough operating income, selling assets to fund current needs is like using the remaining oxygen in the tank simply to stay alive.
After the sale, the club's stake falls to 51.22%. Legal control remains with the club, but the margin has narrowed. That creates a longer-term question about managerial independence.
Capital Erosion and Loss of Control: As the free float rises and the club's ownership stake moves closer to the majority threshold, pressure from markets and institutional investors increases. Control is not necessarily lost in one transaction. Under sustained financial stress, it can disappear piece by piece.
Market Pricing and Reputational Damage: Beşiktaş shares fell by as much as 35% over a one-month period. The Tera-related fund investigation has contributed to a loss of confidence and additional market pressure.
Capital Dominance: Where governance is weak and transparency is limited, "money talks." Formal management structures remain in place, but those providing the financial resources can acquire growing influence over decisions.
Expanding Investigations, Regulatory Filters and the "Domino Effect"
The inclusion of Tera Yatırım and figures known in the sports sector in investigation files could force Turkish clubs to reconsider how they choose financial partners.
The earlier "Seçil Erzan Fund" case was largely an individual fraud case. The current situation has a wider dimension because it touches finance, sport and player representation at the same time.
Clubs should respond with stricter financial and administrative controls.
Pre-Qualification and Regulatory Due Diligence: Clubs must assess prospective financial partners not only by how much money they offer, but by where that money comes from and whether the institution complies with Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) and Capital Markets Board (SPK) rules.
Confronting Informal Financing Networks: The investigations may expose links involving hidden funds, off-the-books investment and intermediary or agent commissions that have long been discussed within the football economy but rarely documented.
Loss of International Confidence: Questionable financial relationships damage the credibility of Turkish football abroad. The consequences can extend to broadcasting income, sponsorships and access to international capital.
An Urgent Action Plan to Protect Brand Value
The four major Turkish clubs listed on Borsa Istanbul already carry high financial risk because of heavy debt, negative equity and negative working capital.
Short-term statements will not solve these problems. Restoring confidence requires stronger intervention from the Turkish Football Federation (TFF).
Three measures are necessary:
Forensic Audits: Financial flows and sponsorship income from the past five years should be reviewed by independent international audit firms, with the results made public.
No Commercial Relationships With Institutions Lacking Credibility and Integrity: Every Turkish lira entering a club should be traceable and documented in line with Know Your Customer (KYC) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards.
Independent Ethics and Compliance Committees: Clubs should establish compliance committees independent of their boards and operating in line with SPK regulations.
Sporting Sanctions and Revenue Security
If investigations force clubs to terminate or suspend sponsorship agreements, the resulting loss of income will immediately feed into their balance sheets.
Turkish clubs already face pressure to comply with TFF and UEFA sustainability rules. In doing so, some have relied heavily on aggressive accounting practices and what can fairly be described as accounting gymnastics.
If sponsorship income disappears from an already weak financial structure, spending limits can quickly come under pressure. Breaches of TFF or UEFA requirements can then produce sporting consequences, including transfer restrictions, points deductions and, in more serious cases, exclusion from European competition.
The same risk applies to clubs that build budgets around promised sponsorship payments. Once those cash flows stop, payment obligations remain. Liquidity pressure then becomes a licensing and regulatory problem.
Clubs therefore need to be more selective about who finances them. High short-term offers from risky structures should not take precedence over established companies with credible balance sheets and commercial records. Contracts should also include bank guarantees wherever possible.
"Financial indiscipline eventually reaches the pitch. It weakens a club's ability to compete."
Financial indiscipline eventually reaches the pitch. It weakens a club's ability to compete.
The turbulence now described as a "fund crisis" can become a liquidity crisis if sponsors withdraw. If financial obligations are then breached, the next stage may involve TFF and UEFA sanctions.
Turkish football has run out of room for temporary fixes. Clubs cannot continue indefinitely by spending future revenue in advance, selling assets to cover current needs or relying on financing structures they cannot sustain. They are facing a serious cash shortage and, just as importantly, a management problem.
The "Big Four" are at the center of this problem, but they are not alone. Clubs need to reassess unstable sponsorship arrangements and unreliable sources of income before the next shock arrives.
The TFF must subject clubs to stricter, independent scrutiny and push for transparent and accountable institutional reform.
Without that change, Turkish football risks losing further ground internationally and becoming less competitive in European football. This is no longer simply a recommendation. It is a warning about where the present model is heading.
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The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Bosphorus News.
About FutbolEkonomi and FESAM: FutbolEkonomi has examined the financial, managerial and economic dimensions of football through data-based analysis since the 2000s, producing research, publications and commentary on the industry. Founded in 2005, the Football Economy Strategic Research Center (FESAM) is an independent research and analysis platform focusing on football economics through academic studies, reports and events covering policy, finance and governance.