By Bosphorus News Economy Desk
The Turkish Shipowners' Association (TAB) is examining whether commercial vessels can carry drone detection and destruction systems under a self-defense concept as attacks on civilian shipping spread across the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.
Its 14-page report, dated August 26, documents 121 commercial vessels by name and another 25 whose identities could not be established. TAB's open-source compilation therefore puts the number of vessels confirmed within its methodology at 146 since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The cases include direct attacks, missile and drone strikes, mine damage and armed interception.
Thirty-four of the vessels were Turkish-owned, Turkish-controlled or Turkish-flagged, equal to 23 percent of the documented total. Five sailed under the Turkish flag. TAB records 37 deaths and 48 injuries among seafarers and port workers over the period.
The increase is concentrated heavily in 2026. The report lists 13 vessels in 2022, eight in 2023, five in 2024 and 13 in 2025, followed by 82 through August 26 this year. Of the full 146 cases, TAB attributes 93 to Russia and 47 to Ukraine. Five involved mines and responsibility for one remains unresolved.
Those figures come with an explicit limitation. TAB describes the report as an open-source intelligence compilation and warns that vessel names, ownership details and attack attribution can conflict between sources. It does not claim to have produced an exhaustive casualty register.
Attacks Spread Beyond Ukrainian Ports
The chronology shows how the threat to merchant shipping changed during the war.
In the opening months of 2022, damage was concentrated around Ukrainian ports including Mariupol, Mykolaiv and Odesa. TAB assesses that commercial ships during this period were more often caught in bombardment around the battle area than deliberately selected as targets.
Direct attacks fell sharply after the United Nations and Türkiye-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative began in July 2022. Mines became the principal maritime danger during the agreement, which remained in force until Russia withdrew in July 2023.
The pattern changed again after the grain deal collapsed. Russian attacks increasingly reached vessels serving Ukrainian ports, including ships carrying grain and other agricultural commodities, while Ukraine later expanded operations against tankers and logistics linked to Russian oil exports and the so-called shadow fleet.
By late 2025 and 2026, the geographic limits had widened as well. TAB records attacks around Russian export terminals, across the Sea of Azov and in the southern Black Sea, including incidents off Türkiye's coast and near the entrance to the Bosphorus.
The commercial retreat had begun before TAB assembled its latest figures. In July, Bosphorus News reported that shipowners were refusing Ukrainian Black Sea port calls as attacks, war-risk costs and carrier suspensions reduced the number of vessels willing to enter the corridor.
Turkish Exposure Extends Beyond the Flag
The five Turkish-flagged ships in TAB's database capture only part of the industry's exposure because many vessels owned, controlled or managed from Türkiye operate under foreign registries.
The association identifies 34 Turkish-owned or controlled ships among the 146 documented cases. It says Greek-owned vessels form the largest ownership group in the dataset, with the Turkish share second at 23 percent.
The Turkish-linked cases span the war from its first day. The Marshall Islands-flagged, Turkish-owned Jupiter YASA was damaged off Odesa on February 24, 2022. More recent entries include ships serving Chornomorsk, Novorossiysk, Tuapse and Taman, as well as vessels operating in international waters across the southern Black Sea.
The human cost has also entered a legal phase. The owner of the Turkish-flagged Reyhan Sarı and 15 crew members are preparing an International Criminal Court filing after a July drone attack killed Turkish engine-room worker Savaş Çakar and injured three crew members.
The shipowner attributes that attack to Ukraine. Responsibility has not been independently established, and Kyiv has not publicly acknowledged striking Reyhan Sarı.
Other recent Turkish-linked cases in TAB's chronology include İnce Ereğli, Ata-2, LDR Yasar, Nadezhda, Necibe, RMS Team, Ural, Star II and Lider Bordo Mavi. The vessels were operating on different trades and under different flags, but all were exposed to the same widening battlefield around commercial routes.
TAB Is Examining Defenses Aboard Merchant Ships
The report moves beyond documenting attacks when it addresses what owners might put aboard their vessels.
TAB says it is studying, from technical, legal and regulatory perspectives, whether drone detection and destruction systems could be installed on merchant ships under a self-defense concept.
It does not identify a specific system and does not say any equipment has been acquired, approved or deployed.
The question is unusually complicated for civilian shipping. Equipment that detects an incoming unmanned aircraft, electronic measures intended to disrupt it and systems capable of physically destroying it can fall under different flag-state rules, weapons legislation, port controls and insurance conditions. A vessel fitted with such equipment would also have to operate across multiple jurisdictions.
TAB's immediate recommendations remain conventional. It advises members to review protection and indemnity and war-risk insurance, follow current security assessments and International Maritime Organization and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations notices, and plan routes through the territorial waters of Black Sea coastal states where practicable.
The counter-drone review addresses something those measures cannot: a weapon already approaching the ship.
Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria have separately adapted their naval cooperation through the Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group. Bosphorus News reported earlier this month that the three-country mechanism had expanded its work to include critical undersea infrastructure.
That mission does not provide active protection to individual merchant vessels. TAB is examining whether shipowners themselves have a lawful option when drones reach commercial traffic outside a protected port or convoy.
The 146 Ships Are a Documented Minimum
The report draws a firm distinction between its own vessel-by-vessel database and much larger battlefield claims that it cannot independently reconstruct.
TAB lists 121 ships by name and separately records 25 incidents involving vessels whose names were not made public. It excludes dozens of additional cases from its main table when individual ships could not be identified with sufficient confidence.
That problem is most visible in Ukraine's Operation MoLoChKa against Russia-linked maritime fuel logistics.
According to figures cited in the report, Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces said the campaign had struck 201 vessels by July 28 and raised the tally to 206 by August 1. TAB does not add those 206 claims to its confirmed total because many could not be matched to identifiable ships.
Russian attacks produce a similar gap between incident-level documentation and aggregate claims. The report cites data indicating that Russia attacked 57 commercial vessels during July, 35 at anchor and 22 while underway, while Ukrainian port authorities separately recorded repeated strikes against ships and port infrastructure.
TAB therefore treats 146 as the number supported by its own methodology, rather than an estimate of every vessel attacked since 2022. Its report also recommends that official decisions be checked against primary sources including the International Maritime Organization, United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations and the relevant flag-state authorities.
July Attacks Cut Russian Tanker Loadings
The escalation is already visible in cargo movements.
TAB cites BIMCO analysis showing dirty tanker loadings from Russian Black Sea and Sea of Azov ports falling 62 percent during the final two weeks of July compared with the previous four-week average, from 2.59 million barrels per day to 0.98 million.
The decline coincided with Ukrainian attacks on vessels and logistics associated with Russian oil exports. Russian strikes continued against Ukrainian ports and ships trading through them during the same period.
The International Maritime Organization condemned attacks on civilian merchant shipping in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov on July 13, as casualties and vessel damage mounted during the summer.
Ankara had already begun pressing Moscow and Kyiv over the expansion of attacks into civilian shipping and energy infrastructure. Bosphorus News traced that progression from incidents inside Türkiye's exclusive economic zone to the widening Black Sea and Caspian security file.
TAB's August 26 report adds the industry's own count to that record. Insurance, route planning and decisions over whether to accept a Black Sea voyage remain the immediate commercial problems; the association is now also examining the legal and technical limits of putting a counter-drone capability aboard a civilian ship.
No counter-drone system has been approved or deployed under the initiative described in the report. TAB says the work remains at the technical, legal and regulatory review stage.
Sources: Turkish Shipowners' Association, International Maritime Organization, BIMCO, Bosphorus News review and reporting.