By Bosphorus News Economy Desk
Türkiye has repriced the 2026 energy shock. Its next assumption is that much of it fades in 2027.
The 2027-2029 Medium-Term Programme assumes Brent crude will average $76 a barrel next year, with the energy import bill falling to $66 billion from $71 billion in 2026 and then to $61 billion by 2029. That path now sits between two sharply different views of how the Gulf oil disruption ends.
S&P Global Energy said on Sept. 11 that, for the first time since the U.S.-Iran war began, it no longer expects Middle Eastern crude production to return to prewar levels by the end of 2027. Its revised outlook puts Dated Brent at an average $86 next year.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) remains considerably more optimistic. Its September Short-Term Energy Outlook forecasts Brent at $74 in 2027 and expects most Middle Eastern crude production to return to near pre-conflict averages by the second quarter.
Ankara's $76 assumption sits close to the EIA path and $10 below S&P Global's 2027 Dated Brent forecast.
A $12 Forecast Gap Built on Gulf Recovery
The difference between the two international forecasts is driven largely by how quickly Middle Eastern barrels can return to market.
S&P Global assumes no definitive end to the conflict, no normalisation of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and no removal of Red Sea disruption risk through 2027. Under that scenario, Middle Eastern crude and condensate exports fluctuate between roughly 10 million and 16 million barrels per day through next year, compared with about 20 million b/d immediately before the war. It expects Dated Brent to remain broadly within an $80-$100 range through 2027, averaging $86.
EIA assumes shipping through Hormuz gradually increases and alternative export routes take more barrels out of the region. Some constraints remain through the end of 2026, but enough production returns for Brent to average $74 next year and fall to around $67 in the second half.
The resulting $12 gap is essentially a bet on the speed of Gulf supply recovery, and Türkiye's programme has made its own choice: its $76 assumption is much closer to the EIA scenario.
Gulf Product Supply Is Recovering More Slowly
The International Energy Agency's September Oil Market Report adds another problem to that comparison: crude oil and refined products are not recovering at the same pace.
Total oil exports from Gulf countries averaged around 13 million b/d in August, close to half their prewar level. Crude losses had narrowed to just below 45 percent as producers increased flows through routes bypassing Hormuz and U.S. military escorts protected some traffic through the strait.
Refined products remain much tighter. Gulf exports of refined products and liquefied petroleum gas were still nearly 60 percent, or 3.7 million b/d, below February levels, while net diesel and gasoil exports averaged just 390,000 b/d in August, slightly more than a quarter of their prewar volume. The IEA has now deferred a full recovery in Gulf supply until 2027.
Crude flows have recovered faster than refined products, where losses remain severe.
That is particularly relevant to Türkiye because much of its supply adjustment this year has taken place in diesel rather than crude.
Russia supplied about 85 percent of Türkiye's diesel imports in 2025. Its share fell to roughly 20 percent in August, while replacement cargoes from India climbed above 120,000 b/d and imports from the United States reached about 90,000 b/d. Both were monthly records in Kpler data going back to 2017.
Türkiye is therefore replacing Russian diesel in a market where one of the world's main product-exporting regions is still supplying barely a quarter of its former diesel and gasoil volumes. A Brent assumption alone does not capture that squeeze because diesel prices also carry refinery margins, freight, insurance and the cost of securing replacement cargoes across longer routes.
The Central Bank and OVP Have Converged on Oil
The new programme has closed a gap that existed between Türkiye's two main official forecasting tracks.
The Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (CBRT) raised its 2027 oil-price assumption to $76.4 a barrel in August, with Governor Fatih Karahan linking the revision directly to the course of the war.
Bosphorus News examined the discrepancy in August, when the outgoing Medium-Term Programme still assumed Brent at $65.1 in 2027. The new OVP puts the figure at $76.
Their inflation paths have moved in the opposite direction. The programme expects inflation at 21 percent in 2027, compared with the central bank's 15 percent forecast.
The Monetary Policy Committee kept its policy rate at 37 percent on Sept. 10 and again identified elevated energy prices linked to geopolitical developments as an upside risk to inflation. The government has therefore accepted a slower disinflation path and brought its oil assumption into line with the central bank.
The Number That Has to Hold
The formal OVP table assumes Brent at an average $88 a barrel in 2026 before dropping to $76 next year. Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz's presentation separately showed $89.3 for 2026 in its comparison of the previous and new programme assumptions.
Measured from the programme table, 2027 requires a $12 decline. Measured from the figure presented by Yılmaz, the drop is $13.3.
Brent has since moved back above $100 a barrel, while S&P Global now expects an $86 average for Dated Brent in 2027 and no full return of Middle Eastern crude production to prewar levels before the end of the year.
The programme nevertheless carries one central oil-price path. Its energy import bill falls by $5 billion between 2026 and 2027, from $71 billion to $66 billion, while the foreign trade deficit remains unchanged at $105 billion even as economic growth is projected to accelerate from 3.3 percent to 4.2 percent.
Those numbers assume that part of this year's energy shock unwinds.
The EIA still has that recovery beginning in earnest by the second quarter of 2027. S&P Global no longer does. The IEA's latest physical trade data show why the difference cannot be reduced to Brent alone: Gulf diesel and gasoil exports remain near one quarter of their prewar level just as Türkiye is searching farther afield for replacement fuel.
Türkiye has already rewritten its 2026 numbers around the war. The 2027 programme now depends on oil becoming materially cheaper and Gulf supply substantially easier to access within the coming year.
If that recovery slips toward the S&P Global scenario, the $66 billion energy import bill is one of the first OVP assumptions exposed.
Sources: Presidency of Strategy and Budget, Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye, U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Agency, S&P Global Energy, Oil & Gas Journal, Reuters, Bosphorus News review and reporting.