By Bosphorus News Geopolitics Desk
Türkiye has brought the heads of two of Libya's rival political institutions together in Ankara, giving the stalled election process another venue less than two weeks after a UN-facilitated agreement on the same file.
House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh and High Council of State Chairman Mohamed Takala met in Ankara on Sept. 10 under Turkish sponsorship. Their joint statement backed the unification of sovereign institutions and the executive authority and called for the political process to remain within Libya's constitutional and legal framework.
Türkiye also offered to host the 6+6 Joint Committee in the coming days so it can complete work on electoral legislation.
The committee is split equally between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State. It produced election laws in 2023, but those laws did not end the dispute over the legal basis for presidential and parliamentary elections. The High Council reconstituted its six-member delegation in May, keeping the mechanism alive.
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has since pursued another format. Its smaller 4+4 process was created to tackle disputes over the High National Elections Commission and the constitutional and legal framework for elections.
That process produced an agreement on Aug. 30. It covers the electoral framework, elections under a single executive authority and a timetable of no more than 24 months. The United Nations Security Council welcomed the agreement on Sept. 8.
Saleh and Takala met in Ankara two days later and agreed to return the 6+6 committee to work.
The two tracks address much of the same political ground, but they are built differently. The 6+6 mechanism belongs to Libya's two rival legislative institutions. The 4+4 format widened participation to representatives of the Government of National Unity and the Libyan National Army General Command as well as the House and High Council.
UN Special Representative Hanna Tetteh had already warned the Security Council against parallel initiatives that could consume time and encourage what she called "forum shopping."
Takala also made his own position clear shortly before travelling to Türkiye. After discussing the 4+4 outcome with British Ambassador Martin Reynolds on Sept. 8, he said any electoral process should rest on a clear constitutional and legal basis and proceed through Libya's competent institutions and national consensus.
The Ankara meeting does not establish a Turkish challenge to the UN roadmap. The Saleh-Takala statement shares several of UNSMIL's stated goals, including elections and institutional unification. But it does return the House and High Council to the center of the electoral-law file and positions Türkiye as a prospective host for the 6+6 committee.
That follows a wider Turkish reopening toward eastern Libya.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited both sides of the country on Aug. 11 and 12. In Tripoli, he met Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, Presidential Council President Mohammad al-Menfi and Takala. In Benghazi, he met Khalifa Haftar, Saddam Haftar and Saleh, along with Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund chief Belqasim Haftar.
The Sept. 10 meeting moves beyond separate contacts. Saleh, one of eastern Libya's principal political figures, has now met the head of the High Council of State at a Turkish-hosted political meeting, with Ankara offering to host the next 6+6 talks.
Greece is also working across Libya's political divide, although on different files.
Official Greek statements show a clear split. Maritime delimitation talks are being conducted with the internationally recognized government in Tripoli. Greece's Foreign Ministry said in June that eastern Libyan authorities were not taking part in those technical negotiations, although they were being kept informed.
Migration is handled differently. Athens has been dealing directly with eastern Libya over departures toward Crete and Gavdos. The Greek Foreign Ministry has identified the Tobruk-Crete-Gavdos route by name and said Greek officials were working with eastern Libyan authorities to reduce those flows.
Tripoli is therefore Greece's formal counterpart on maritime delimitation. Eastern Libya is central to its migration policy on the route toward southern Greece.
The maritime dispute prevents either camp from fitting neatly into a Türkiye-versus-Greece alignment.
In December 2025, Saleh rejected the 2019 Türkiye-Libya maritime delimitation memorandum in its current form, arguing that it lacked parliamentary approval.
But Saleh also said he was not opposed in principle to an agreement with Türkiye. He called for maritime negotiations involving Libya, Türkiye, Greece and Egypt and disputed the maritime effect Greece assigns to Crete.
Eastern Libya has challenged Greek positions as well. The parliament-appointed government protested Greek hydrocarbon licensing south of Crete in 2025, arguing that parts of the licensed area fell within Libya's claimed exclusive economic zone. It also sent the 2019 Türkiye-Libya agreement to the House of Representatives for review.
There is no evidence that the Ankara meeting changed Saleh's position on the 2019 memorandum, or that maritime delimitation was discussed.
Its value to Ankara lies elsewhere. Türkiye now has direct political access to an institution whose position will carry political weight in any attempt to establish a unified Libyan approach to maritime agreements.
The Ankara meeting also came during an active week in the Eastern Mediterranean.
On Sept. 8, Egypt, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus renewed their position that maritime delimitation agreements and memoranda should comply with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The declaration did not name Türkiye or the 2019 Türkiye-Libya memorandum.
Two days later, the MEDUSA 15 multinational exercise began south of Crete, in waters Greek reporting has linked to the maritime dispute.
The same Libyan institutions now sit across several connected files: elections, migration, maritime jurisdiction and Eastern Mediterranean security.
Greece needs Tripoli for maritime negotiations and eastern Libya for migration control. Türkiye retains its established relationship with western Libya while rebuilding political and security contacts in the east.
The Saleh-Takala meeting adds another element. Ankara is no longer dealing only with Libya's rival centers separately. It has brought the heads of two competing political institutions to the same table and offered to host the committee responsible for completing electoral legislation.
Türkiye's offer to host the 6+6 committee is now on the table. As of Sept. 11, no Ankara meeting of the committee had been announced.
Sources: Libyan News Agency, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, High Council of State, Türkiye's Foreign Ministry, Hellenic Foreign Ministry, Bosphorus News review and reporting.