Libya's eastern-based parliament has reversed its opposition to the 2019 maritime agreement with Türkiye, giving Ankara support from the political camp that once rejected its presence in Libya. In his October 23 analysis for IBNAEU, Spiros Sideris examines how that change affects Greece's diplomatic options, Egypt's negotiations over maritime boundaries and Washington's approach to regional energy security.
The House of Representatives voted on October 20 to approve the memorandum and rescind its 2020 rejection. Türkiye, which backed the former Tripoli government against forces led by Khalifa Haftar, has since developed contacts with Benghazi. Sideris sees the vote as part of that rapprochement. It strengthens Ankara's political reach inside Libya without ending the country's institutional divisions or determining the maritime rights of neighbouring states.
The opening may extend beyond maritime diplomacy. Sideris cites Libyan and regional reporting on preparations for talks between Saddam Haftar and Tripoli's deputy defense minister Abdussalam al-Zubi over military responsibilities and a possible joint command. The discussions have not produced a confirmed agreement. If they advance, Ankara's contacts with both Libyan camps could give it a role in shaping security institutions as well as future decisions on energy and maritime claims.
From Athens' perspective, the immediate diplomatic response runs through Cairo. Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis and Egyptian counterpart Badr Abdelatty spoke on October 22, reiterating their rejection of the Türkiye–Libya memorandum. Yet their public accounts of further maritime talks were not identical. Greece explicitly referred to extending their 2020 delimitation, while Egypt discussed continued consultations without specifying where an extension would run.
That distinction matters because their 2020 agreement covers only part of the sea between the 26th and 28th meridians. It was negotiated rather than drawn by automatically giving Greek islands the maximum possible effect. A new line eastward would raise questions involving Rhodes and potentially Kastellorizo; a westward extension would engage claims off Crete and Libya. Islands generate maritime entitlements under the law of the sea, but their precise weight in a negotiated boundary depends on geography and the parties involved.
Cyprus adds another complication. The 2003 Cyprus–Egypt agreement provides for revisiting endpoints in light of later agreements with neighbouring states. Türkiye has argued for a possible boundary with Egypt west of Cyprus, although Cairo has announced no such negotiation. Sideris's point is that opposition to the Türkiye–Libya pact does not resolve the separate question of where Egypt would agree to draw a new boundary with Greece.
Cairo is pursuing that discussion while rebuilding relations with Ankara. Abdelatty's participation in the October 23 ministerial meetings in Istanbul showed how Egypt can work with Türkiye on wider regional security without adopting its maritime claims. Cooperation with Greece and Cyprus continues, but Egypt has room to weigh each proposed delimitation against its own geographic and political interests.
Washington has taken a different public approach. Responding to questions about the Libyan vote, the US State Department urged good-faith talks between Eastern Mediterranean partners, including NATO allies Greece and Türkiye, and linked dispute resolution to more predictable conditions for commercial investment and energy exploration. It neither endorsed the maritime memorandum nor publicly condemned the parliamentary decision. Sideris cautions against treating US energy interests as an automatic commitment to Athens' position—or assuming Washington engineered Benghazi's shift.
His conclusion is directed principally at Greece: political partnerships with Egypt, Cyprus and the United States remain important, but they cannot substitute for agreed boundaries or specific diplomatic commitments. Benghazi's decision has changed Ankara's position in Libya. Whether Athens can turn its relationships into durable maritime agreements remains unsettled.
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This article is an edited summary of Spiros Sideris's analysis originally published by Bosphorus News partner IBNAEU. Read the full original analysis.