Hormuz Toll Dispute Raises Türkiye Corridor Stakes as Pakistan Pushes Iran Talks
By Bosphorus News Energy Desk
Pakistan moved deeper into the U.S.-Iran diplomatic track on Friday as talks over Tehran's uranium stockpile and control of the Strait of Hormuz turned a Gulf crisis into a wider energy-route dispute that directly touches Türkiye's corridor role, Europe's supply planning and the Eastern Mediterranean gas map.
Pakistan's Interior Minister Syed Mohsin Naqvi met Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi in Tehran as Islamabad sought a breakthrough in talks aimed at ending the war and reopening one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints. The diplomatic push came after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that an Iranian tolling system in the Strait of Hormuz would make any diplomatic agreement with Tehran unworkable.
Rubio said on May 21 that "no one in the world" supported a tolling system and called the idea a threat to global commerce. President Donald Trump also rejected any attempt to turn the strait into a paid passage, saying the waterway should remain open and free.
The dispute matters because Hormuz is no longer only a military flashpoint. Reuters reported that daily traffic through the strait has fallen sharply from a pre-war average of 125 to 140 vessels to about 10 in recent days, leaving around 20,000 seafarers stranded on hundreds of ships in the Gulf. Cargo ships, dry bulk carriers and some chemical and liquefied petroleum gas tankers have continued to move in limited numbers, but crude oil tanker traffic remains severely constrained.
That pressure has already pushed Türkiye-linked routes into sharper focus, as Bosphorus News detailed in its reporting on how the Hormuz crisis is raising Türkiye's corridor stakes. Pakistan's mediation is not a Türkiye story by itself. It becomes one because the negotiation is now tied to whether a maritime chokepoint used by global energy markets remains open, neutral and predictable.
Türkiye is not a party to the Pakistan-Iran talks, but it is exposed to their outcome. Ankara is an energy importer, a NATO summit host in July, a Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean power, and a central state in the overland routes linking Europe, the South Caucasus, the Caspian and Central Asia. If Hormuz remains restricted or becomes subject to tolling and inspection control, the economic burden will be felt through energy prices, current account pressure, inflation expectations and shipping costs.
The same logic strengthens Türkiye's corridor argument. A prolonged Hormuz disruption would not make Turkish pipelines or rail routes a direct substitute for Gulf oil and LNG. It would, however, increase the strategic value of every diversified route that reduces exposure to a single maritime chokepoint. Bosphorus News has previously examined Türkiye's pipeline role as Hormuz disruption grows, including the relevance of pipeline access, Caspian connectivity and potential Turkmen gas flows.
The gas map adds another layer. TürkStream does not replace Hormuz, but it shows how Türkiye has become harder to separate from Europe's energy security debate at a time of maritime disruption. Bosphorus News has reported on TürkStream's growing role in Europe's gas supply map, a position that gains more strategic weight when energy buyers are forced to think about route resilience rather than only price.
That broader role is also visible in Türkiye's gas diplomacy. A recent Atlantic Council report, covered by Bosphorus News, argued that Ankara is turning supply diversification into leverage through LNG, pipelines and regional gas diplomacy. The Hormuz crisis makes Türkiye's use of gas diversification as strategic leverage more relevant, because a crisis in one chokepoint increases the value of states that can connect multiple supply routes and political theatres.
The Eastern Mediterranean is part of the same calculation. QatarEnergy, ExxonMobil and Egypt have moved to study the development of Cyprus gas through Egypt's existing LNG infrastructure. That route does not resolve Cyprus's political disputes, but it shows how regional energy planning is shifting toward existing infrastructure, flexible exports and shorter development timelines while Hormuz remains under pressure.
The NATO angle is narrower but important. Rubio made his Hormuz comments while travelling to Sweden for NATO's foreign ministers' meeting, which is preparing the Ankara Summit. Türkiye will host that summit in July as the alliance debates defence capacity, burden sharing and the value of infrastructure across its southern flank.
Pakistan's diplomacy may still fail to produce a breakthrough. Iran has shown little willingness to surrender control over its enriched uranium stockpile, while the Hormuz file has become a test of sovereignty, sanctions leverage and post-war bargaining power. A fragile ceasefire remains in place, but the shipping map has already changed.
If Pakistan's mediation fails, Hormuz will remain more than a Gulf chokepoint. It will keep feeding into Europe's supply planning, Türkiye's corridor leverage and the energy-security map stretching from the South Caucasus to the Eastern Mediterranean.
***Sources: Reuters, Anadolu Agency, NATO-related public remarks and Bosphorus News reporting.