Trump Says Iran Deal Nears as Türkiye’s Hormuz Mine Clearing Role Returns

Bosphorus News Geopolitics Desk

Türkiye's possible role in clearing mines from the Strait of Hormuz is returning to the diplomatic agenda after U.S. President Donald Trump said a framework agreement with Iran was "largely negotiated" and could reopen one of the world's most important maritime energy routes.

Reuters reported on May 24 that Trump said an emerging memorandum of understanding with Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, whose closure has disrupted global energy markets since the U.S. and Israel launched their war against Iran in February. The reported framework could include a phased end to hostilities, unrestricted shipping through the strait, renewed Iranian oil sales and further talks on Iran's nuclear program.

AP also reported that Trump described the deal as close to completion, with Pakistan-led mediation playing a major role and Iran state media acknowledging a framework agreement focused on ending the conflict and opening detailed talks within 30 to 60 days. The deal is not final, and the details remain contested.

That uncertainty is central to the story. A separate Reuters report, citing Axios, said a proposed arrangement could include a 60-day ceasefire extension, reopening Hormuz, clearing Iranian mines from the strait, allowing Iran to sell oil and easing the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports. The White House did not comment on that report.

Iran's public line remains guarded. Reuters reported on May 23 that senior Iranian negotiator and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said Tehran would not compromise in talks with Washington, citing mistrust and warning of a stronger response if hostilities resume.

This leaves Hormuz inside a narrow diplomatic window rather than a settled arrangement. The strait's reopening is now being discussed as part of a wider de-escalation package, but the questions of control, verification, mine clearance, oil flows and sanctions relief remain politically exposed.

Türkiye's relevance comes from two connected tracks. The first is practical transit diplomacy. Turkish-owned vessels were among the ships affected by the closure, and Ankara has already worked through case-by-case channels to get some of them through the strait. Anadolu Agency reported on April 6 that a third Turkish-owned vessel, Ocean Thunder, safely left the Gulf through Hormuz after efforts coordinated with Türkiye's Foreign Ministry.

Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu said at the time that three Turkish-owned ships that had been waiting in the Gulf since the beginning of the war had safely exited the strait. That detail matters because it shows Türkiye is not approaching Hormuz only as a distant energy security file. Turkish maritime trade has already required direct diplomatic handling.

The second track is Türkiye's conditional mine clearing position. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in London on April 25 that Türkiye could consider taking part in demining operations in Hormuz after a possible Iran US peace agreement. Reuters reported that Fidan described such a mission as a humanitarian responsibility that would likely be handled by a technical team after a deal.

Defence Minister Yaşar Güler updated the same line during EFES 2026. In remarks published by Türkiye Today on May 23, Güler said Türkiye supports freedom of navigation under international law and could support multinational initiatives aimed at preserving maritime security in Hormuz. He added that Türkiye could participate in humanitarian mine clearing activities if the parties reach an agreement.

The wording from both ministers is careful. Türkiye is not presenting itself as a combatant or as part of a pressure coalition against Iran. Ankara is defining a possible role only after an agreement, under a technical and humanitarian frame tied to safe navigation.

That distinction will become more important if the reported deal moves forward. Mine clearance in Hormuz would not be a symbolic contribution. It would be part of making the strait usable again for energy flows, commercial shipping and insurance markets after months of disruption.

Washington's objection to any Iranian tolling or control mechanism adds another layer. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said any Iranian tolling system in Hormuz would make a diplomatic deal unfeasible, calling such a plan unacceptable and illegal, according to Iran International.

The Guardian also reported that Washington has pushed back against an Iranian plan for a Persian Gulf Strait Authority that would impose fees and control access through the strait. That dispute sits at the heart of the negotiation problem: reopening Hormuz is not only about removing mines or allowing ships to pass, but about who controls the rules of passage.

Türkiye has an interest in keeping that issue from hardening into a new maritime regime. A system that allows case-by-case passage for selected vessels may help individual Turkish ships in the short term, but it does not restore the predictable maritime environment needed by energy markets, insurers and commercial operators.

The economic stakes are direct. Hormuz disruption increases energy cost pressure across importing economies, including Türkiye. It also raises the value of alternative routes and infrastructure where Ankara has been trying to build leverage, from TANAP and TürkAkım to the Middle Corridor and Trans-Caspian energy and transport links.

That wider corridor picture does not replace Hormuz. It explains why Ankara is attentive to the strait's reopening while also promoting other routes. Türkiye benefits from a functioning Hormuz because energy markets stabilize, but it also gains strategic value when the crisis strengthens arguments for diversified corridors through Türkiye.

Pakistan's role should not be understated. AP reported that Pakistani-led mediation has been central to the emerging framework, with support from regional actors including Qatar and Egypt. Türkiye's position is different. Ankara has kept contact channels open with Tehran and has signaled a possible technical maritime role, but Pakistan appears to be the more visible mediator in this phase.

That gives the Turkish angle a cleaner shape. Türkiye is not the central broker of the deal. Its role, if the framework advances, is more likely to emerge in the practical phase after an agreement: demining, safe navigation, maritime coordination and protection of commercial flows.

The deal window remains fragile. Trump's claim of a largely negotiated framework has raised expectations, but Iranian statements continue to stress resistance to pressure and distrust of Washington. Israel's position, U.S. domestic criticism, sanctions sequencing and the status of Iran's nuclear program could still weaken or delay any arrangement.

The Turkish role therefore depends on a condition that has not yet been met. Ankara's mine clearing option becomes relevant only if the parties agree on reopening Hormuz and a multinational technical mechanism is formed. Until then, Türkiye's position is a prepared option, not an operational deployment.

The importance of that option lies in its precision. It gives Ankara a place in the Hormuz file without turning Türkiye into a party to the war. If the strait reopens, Türkiye's contribution may appear in the narrow field where diplomacy becomes physical work: clearing mines, restoring passage and helping turn a negotiated text into a usable maritime route.

***Sources: Reuters; Associated Press; Anadolu Agency; The Guardian; Iran International and Bosphorus News reporting.