US Senate Bill Draws IMEC’s EastMed Map Without Türkiye
By Bosphorus News Geopolitics Desk
A new U.S. Senate bill has put Türkiye's place in the next corridor map under sharper scrutiny, not because it formally bars Ankara from the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, but because it defines IMEC's Eastern Mediterranean gateway without Türkiye in the text.
The Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act, introduced in the Senate on April 29, 2026, by Senator Cory Booker with Senator Dave McCormick as cosponsor, says its purpose is to support the role of Eastern Mediterranean countries as a "strategic gateway" in IMEC. The bill was read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
The legal wording is the point. The Senate text defines "Eastern Mediterranean country" as Egypt, Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and Israel. It separately defines "IMEC country" as the European Union, France, Germany, India, Italy, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. Türkiye appears in neither definition.
That does not prove that Washington has made a formal decision to exclude Türkiye from IMEC. It does show that one current U.S. legislative text is drawing the corridor's Eastern Mediterranean map through Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, while placing the UAE, Saudi Arabia, India, the EU and major European states inside the wider IMEC architecture.
From Ankara's perspective, that distinction matters. Türkiye's objection to IMEC has never been only cartographic. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has previously argued that a corridor between India, the Gulf and Europe cannot function properly without Türkiye. The Senate bill does not settle that argument, but it gives it a new legislative frame.
The House track is also active. A House version, H.R. 3307, was introduced on May 8, 2025, by Representative Brad Schneider with Representatives Gus Bilirakis, Dina Titus, Nicole Malliotakis and Chris Pappas. Schneider's office said in January 2026 that the bill had passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee by a 45-2 vote.
In his statement on the House committee vote, Schneider said the legislation would help anchor the Eastern Mediterranean in U.S. foreign policy and described the region as a "central hub for energy, infrastructure, and diplomacy." That language is important because it treats the Eastern Mediterranean not only as a security space, but as a connector between India, the Middle East and Europe.
The Senate version carries the same logic into the upper chamber. Booker's office described the bill as bipartisan legislation to advance U.S. energy security, economic interests and partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean. The official framing ties energy security, trade, critical infrastructure, supply chains and defence cooperation into one corridor package.
The text also folds IMEC into older U.S.-backed Eastern Mediterranean formats. It refers to the Greece-Cyprus-Israel-U.S. 3+1 framework, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum and the Abraham Accords. It lists the Great Sea Interconnector, the GREGY Interconnection Project, the Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector and Eastern Mediterranean LNG terminals as infrastructure with strategic relevance for European energy security.
This is where the Türkiye angle becomes larger than a missing name in a list. Washington's legislative language is connecting energy grids, ports, LNG terminals, digital systems, supply chains and defence partnerships across a regional map in which Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt become the Eastern Mediterranean gateway countries for IMEC.
Türkiye is working another map. Ankara's route logic runs through Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government, Ceyhan and the Development Road project. It is a Gulf-to-Europe corridor concept that depends on rail, road, energy, logistics and security integration across Iraq and Türkiye rather than maritime transfer through the Israel-Greece axis.
The timing sharpened that contrast. Erdoğan met KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani on May 9, with Turkish officials saying trade, energy and transport cooperation were on the agenda. Anadolu Agency reported that Erdoğan said the Development Road would bring major benefits not only to Iraq, but also to Gulf countries.
That makes the Barzani meeting more than a bilateral Iraq file. It placed Development Road, Ceyhan and northern energy routes inside the same corridor debate that IMEC is now carrying through Washington. Türkiye is not simply reacting to an American bill. It is trying to keep a separate land corridor politically alive at a moment when IMEC's Eastern Mediterranean language is becoming more institutional.
Ceyhan remains central to that Turkish reading. The port is not only an energy outlet. It is part of Ankara's argument that Türkiye can connect Gulf supply, Iraqi infrastructure, Eastern Mediterranean access and European markets more directly than routes that bypass Turkish territory. As Bosphorus News outlined in its coverage of Türkiye, the KRG and Ceyhan energy security, Ankara's northern energy corridor logic now sits inside a wider supply security debate.
The same pattern is visible outside the Eastern Mediterranean. U.S. infrastructure policy increasingly links energy, electricity grids, digital systems and strategic access, a pattern also seen in Washington's Balkan energy and AI network beginning with Kosovo. IMEC belongs to that wider shift. Corridors are no longer only about transport lanes. They are becoming instruments of alignment.
Greece, Cyprus and the UAE are also moving through the same policy vocabulary. Their recent diplomatic engagements have centered on investment, infrastructure, technology, artificial intelligence, renewable energy and connectivity. That does not prove a formal bloc against Türkiye. It does show that IMEC's surrounding language is converging around the same themes: ports, grids, capital, logistics, clean energy and corridor resilience.
Türkiye's challenge is different. IMEC already has a diplomatic brand backed by Washington, New Delhi, Brussels and Gulf capitals. Development Road has a strong geographic argument, but it still depends on Iraq's internal stability, financing, security guarantees, execution capacity and sustained Gulf interest.
The Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act should therefore be read from Ankara not as a final verdict, but as a warning about legislative momentum. U.S. corridor policy is beginning to define the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of gateway countries, critical infrastructure and IMEC connectivity. Türkiye is absent from those definitions.
That absence does not end Türkiye's corridor role. It raises the cost of leaving that role undefined. If Ankara wants Development Road to compete with IMEC's political branding, it will need to move beyond project language and build a clearer diplomatic, financial and security architecture around Iraq, Ceyhan and the Gulf-Europe land bridge.
Türkiye's problem is not that one Senate bill excludes it from IMEC by law. The harder issue is that Washington's current legislative map can describe the Eastern Mediterranean gateway without Türkiye at all.
***Sources: S. 4443, Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act, U.S. Senate, introduced April 29, 2026; H.R. 3307, Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act, U.S. House of Representatives, introduced May 8, 2025; U.S. Congress / GovInfo bill text; Office of Senator Cory Booker, April 29, 2026; Office of Representative Brad Schneider, January 21, 2026; Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, May 9, 2026; Anadolu Agency, May 9, 2026; Bosphorus News reporting.