PKK Peace Process Stalls After Iran War Hits Reform Track
By Bosphorus News Türkiye Desk
By Bosphorus News Türkiye Desk
Türkiye's renewed effort to end the PKK conflict has slowed sharply after the Iran war added a new layer of regional risk to an already fragile political process, leaving Ankara, Kurdish political actors and the PKK divided over who should take the next step.
Reuters reported on May 13 that the war in Iran began two weeks after a Turkish parliamentary commission completed recommendations for advancing the process. The timing has hardened positions on both sides. Ankara wants the PKK to fully disarm before legal reforms move forward. PKK figures say laying down arms without legal guarantees would leave the organization exposed at a moment of regional uncertainty.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has rejected claims that the process is collapsing, telling critics not to trust "pessimists." His office referred Reuters to his recent public remarks, where he has continued to frame the initiative as part of Türkiye's "terror-free" agenda.
The main blockage is no longer the existence of a political track. It is the order of implementation. Türkiye wants proof that the PKK's armed structure has ended. The PKK wants a legal framework before giving up its remaining leverage. DEM Party officials say the government has not explained why reform steps have been delayed.
Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit, a senior DEM Party lawmaker, told Reuters the process was in "a pause, but not a complete halt." She said the government's demand for complete disarmament before legal change was unrealistic and argued that Ankara appeared to be waiting on developments in Iran and the wider Middle East.
As Bosphorus News reported in its earlier coverage of Türkiye's Kurdish peace process and reform delay, the reform timetable had already become the weakest point in the process before the Iran war changed Ankara's regional security calculations. The latest Reuters account gives that delay a sharper context: Kurdish political actors now read the absence of legal movement as a sign that the government is holding the file back, while Ankara is tying any legislative step to verified disarmament.
PKK political spokesman Zagros Hiwa told Reuters that Türkiye had "unilaterally frozen" the process. Murat Karayılan, a senior PKK commander, was quoted by the Fırat News Agency as saying that disarmament without legal guarantees would be "irrational," adding that no one had reached out to put the process "back on track."
Karayılan also described the decision to end a 42-year armed strategy as "strategic," not routine. That language points to the core problem facing the process. The PKK has already declared a shift away from armed struggle, but Ankara is still seeking verifiable steps beyond symbolic gestures.
The parliamentary track had appeared to offer a controlled route forward. On February 18, Türkiye's National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission approved a report on the next phase of the "Terror-Free Türkiye" process. The report tied legal steps to the PKK's full disarmament and self-dissolution, with verification by Turkish security institutions.
That same framework also left space for reintegration measures and a temporary, purpose-built legal arrangement once weapons are laid down. As Bosphorus News detailed in its earlier reporting on Türkiye's emerging PKK disarmament law and reintegration plan, the challenge was already clear before the Iran war: Ankara was trying to build a legal path that could manage disarmament without being presented domestically as a broad amnesty.
The Iran war has made that balance harder to hold. Reuters reported that Türkiye warned of the risk of Kurdish militants in Iran and Iraq remobilizing as regional instability deepened. The agency also reported that Türkiye blocked an idea involving a ground attack on Iran through Iraq using Kurdish forces, a claim that underlines how quickly the peace file has become tied to a wider regional security map.
The domestic political cost is also rising. Reuters cited a December 2025 Konda Barometer survey showing that 79 percent of respondents believed the state was wrong to engage with Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed PKK leader. The same survey found that 62 percent of AK Party voters held that view.
That public mood makes the Öcalan question especially sensitive. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, Erdoğan's nationalist ally and the political figure who opened the current process in October 2024, said on May 5 that Öcalan's status could no longer be ignored. Bahçeli proposed a "Peace Process and Politicisation Coordination Office" and said the PKK's founding leader should be given a defined role to help move the process forward.
The government has not publicly endorsed Bahçeli's proposal.
DEM Party co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan described the proposal as "historic" and said parliament should place it within a legal framework. His position reflects the Kurdish political movement's broader argument that the process cannot advance through security verification alone.
The timeline shows how quickly the opening narrowed. Bahçeli launched the process in October 2024. Öcalan made his historic call for disarmament in February 2025. The PKK announced a decision to dissolve in May 2025. A symbolic weapons-burning ceremony followed in northern Iraq in July 2025. The parliamentary commission completed its roadmap in February 2026. Days later, the Iran war changed the regional context.
Since then, the mechanism has struggled to move. Ankara does not want to legislate before it sees irreversible disarmament. PKK figures say they will not disarm without legal guarantees. DEM says the reform timetable has lost momentum. Bahçeli's intervention has pushed Öcalan's role back into the center of the debate, but without a government answer.
The process remains formally alive because none of the main actors has walked away. Its practical problem is more severe. Türkiye's legal track, the PKK's disarmament track and the regional security track are now moving at different speeds, and the Iran war has given each side a stronger reason to avoid the first irreversible concession.