Mitsotakis and Erdoğan’s February 11 meeting in Türkiye has been announced. Chios came first.

Murat YILDIZ

On February 3, 2026, a collision off the coast of Chios between a Greek Coast Guard vessel and a migrant boat killed at least 14 people. The incident came just days before preparations for a Mitsotakis–Erdoğan meeting were being reaffirmed. ‘Dialogue was active.’ ‘Channels were open.’ When coordination and speed were required, sovereignty claims took over. What followed was not joint action but competing NAVTEX notices, disputed authority, and conflicting narratives.

This was not an exception. It showed how Türkiye–Greece dialogue operates.

Dialogue continues. Meetings are scheduled. Councils convene. In practice, however, dialogue between Türkiye and Greece functions as a holding mechanism with almost no practical effect. This is not accidental. It reflects a preference for managing disputes rather than confronting them. Issues are neither resolved nor narrowed. They are suspended through process, while their substance remains intact, contested, and in some cases grows more complex over time. The limits of this approach surface when crises test the system.

This dynamic is visible not in the absence of diplomatic contact, but in how dialogue operates alongside friction. As Bosphorus News reported in January, preparations for a leaders’ meeting were already under way at senior political and diplomatic levels, even without a fixed date. Channels remained open. Dialogue remained active in form, but limited in effect. During the same period, the Aegean saw renewed NAVTEX disputes, sharper public statements, and fresh lines drawn over authority and jurisdiction.

The pattern repeated in maritime affairs. While dialogue formats remained intact, NAVTEX announcements and counter-statements re-emerged. Türkiye rejected Greek claims related to jurisdiction and time limits. Athens responded with legal objections and political warnings. Positions were restated. Boundaries were asserted. Dialogue did not intervene in operational behaviour. It ran on a separate track.

The Chios incident was the clearest test of this structure. It did not produce rapid coordination of search and rescue efforts. Competing claims over authority took precedence. NAVTEX and counter-NAVTEX notices were issued. Responsibility was contested. As lives were lost at sea, coordination gave way to sovereignty lines. Dialogue existed, but it did not shape behaviour when clarity and speed were required.

We have examined this divergence before in the context of Türkiye–Greece dialogue. The current tensions do not result from a lack of communication. They stem from incompatible expectations of what dialogue is meant to achieve. Türkiye and Greece continue to use the same language while operating on different strategic assumptions. That gap remains unresolved.

This structure produces a predictable outcome. High-level political meetings continue. Dialogue formats are repeatedly reaffirmed. Yet these mechanisms do not alter conduct under pressure. They do not suspend unilateral steps, moderate public messaging, or establish routines that function during incidents. Process persists. Restraint does not follow.

The timing of the Chios incident sharpened this contradiction. It occurred as dialogue was being publicly reaffirmed and preparations for a Mitsotakis–Erdoğan meeting were already under way. Even then, coordination failed in a humanitarian emergency. Sovereignty claims prevailed over joint action. Talks continued. Frameworks remained intact. When consequences were immediate and human, the system did not hold.