Armenia-Türkiye Dialogue Advances, But Baku Still Sets the Political Limit
By Bosphorus News Geopolitics Desk
Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan's description of the dialogue with Türkiye as "excellent" captures the new tone in Yerevan, where normalization with Ankara is increasingly presented as part of a wider strategy built around regional connectivity, reduced isolation and closer engagement with Europe.
The shift is visible in the examples Armenian officials now choose to emphasize. Mirzoyan pointed to the memorandum on the restoration of the historic Ani bridge, while earlier remarks from Yerevan also referred to discussions around the Gyumri-Kars railway line and other practical steps that would connect Armenia more directly to Türkiye and the wider region.
Those contacts show that the process is no longer frozen in the old language of symbolic diplomacy. Türkiye and Armenia have kept their special-envoy channel open, infrastructure-oriented confidence-building measures have moved onto the agenda, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said in December 2025 that Ankara would take "some symbolic steps" in early 2026 as part of the normalization process.
The pace, however, remains deliberately controlled. Armenian special envoy Ruben Rubinyan, asked in January 2026 about Erdoğan's remarks, declined to preview possible developments and said he preferred to make announcements only after something had actually occurred. As Bosphorus News previously reported, that cautious sequencing reflects Ankara's preference for limited steps that keep the process alive without detaching it from the wider Armenia-Azerbaijan peace file.
Türkiye's position has been consistent. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated in November 2025 that Ankara would normalize relations with Armenia after Armenia and Azerbaijan sign a final peace treaty, keeping the political ceiling of the process tied to the Baku-Yerevan track even as technical and symbolic measures continue between Ankara and Yerevan.
That linkage has become more important as Azerbaijan's relations with European institutions have deteriorated over the Karabakh file. Recent European Parliament pressure over the return of Karabakh Armenians, detainees and cultural heritage has triggered a sharp reaction from Baku, which sees those moves as an attempt to reopen issues it considers settled after the 2023 restoration of Azerbaijani control over Karabakh.
The dispute has already widened into a sharper Azerbaijan-European Parliament rift, with Baku accusing European lawmakers of reviving a biased approach toward the post-Karabakh settlement, as Bosphorus News detailed in its recent report.
This creates a more sensitive environment for Ankara. Türkiye can support practical engagement with Armenia, especially where it serves transport, trade and regional connectivity, but it is unlikely to move toward full normalization in a way that appears to separate Ankara's Armenia policy from Azerbaijan's post-war position.
Armenia, meanwhile, is trying to use the opening with Türkiye as part of a broader foreign-policy diversification. Its engagement with the European Union has deepened through connectivity, reform and security tracks, while Yerevan presents normalization with Ankara as a route out of regional isolation and as one component of a less Russia-dependent diplomatic architecture.
The result is a process that looks more active than before but remains politically bounded. Ani bridge restoration, railway discussions and special-envoy contacts all point to movement, while the decisive threshold still sits in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process and in the question of how the post-Karabakh order will be accepted by the main regional actors.
Türkiye-Armenia normalization may be gaining momentum, but the key is still in Baku.