What US Credit Card Data Reveals About a Question Türkiye Still Avoids

A recent Federal Reserve–based study on US credit card markets reaches an uncomfortable conclusion. Persistently high credit card interest rates are not primarily explained by borrower risk, regulatory costs, or reward programmes. Even after these factors are stripped out, banks retain significant pricing power.

The question has returned to the surface as households continue to face high borrowing costs, despite tighter oversight and repeated assurances that risk dynamics justify current pricing.

The study is US-specific. It makes no reference to Türkiye, Turkish banks, or Turkish regulation. Yet it brings into focus a question that Türkiye’s financial debate tends to sidestep.

Are high credit card interest rates always the mechanical outcome of risk and macroeconomic conditions, or do market structure and pricing power play a larger role than is usually acknowledged?

Risk Is Only Part of the Story

The study shows that in the United States, credit card annual percentage rates (APR) remain high even after accounting for default risk, funding costs, and capital requirements. Risk matters, but it does not explain persistence.

This matters because in Türkiye, high credit card interest rates are routinely presented as an unavoidable consequence of inflation, volatility, and borrower risk. The logic is simple and linear: higher risk leads to higher rates.

The US data complicates that logic. It suggests that once pricing power is entrenched, interest rates can remain structurally elevated even when risk conditions stabilise.

Pricing Power, Not Just Regulation

Another clear finding lies in what does not drive rates. Regulatory capital requirements and compliance costs, often cited as justification for high pricing, explain far less than commonly claimed.

This does not mean regulation is irrelevant. It means regulation alone does not determine outcomes.

In Türkiye, the discussion is largely shaped by official statements and sector narratives that rarely move beyond macro risk and inflation. Questions of market structure and pricing behaviour receive far less attention.

A Distinction Türkiye Rarely Makes

In the US system, there is a sharp divide between two types of card users. Transactors, who pay balances in full, effectively pay no interest. Borrowers, who roll balances, bear the full cost of high APRs. The system openly relies on this separation.

In Türkiye, that distinction is far less clear. Instalment structures, regulatory caps, and payment practices blur the line, yet card-related profitability remains strong. The mechanism differs, but the outcome is familiar.

This raises a question Türkiye rarely asks directly: through which channel is credit card profitability actually generated?

Why the Comparison Still Matters

The point is not that Türkiye mirrors the United States. It does not. The point is that high credit card interest rates are not automatically explained by risk alone.

The US evidence shows that pricing power and market structure can sustain elevated rates even within a heavily regulated, data-rich financial system. That insight does not translate mechanically to Türkiye, but it challenges the comfort of familiar explanations.

For Türkiye, the issue is not whether credit card interest rates are high. It is whether the debate has become too narrow to explain why they remain so.

If high interest rates are always attributed to risk, the burden should be on the system to show clearly where that risk lies. The debate rarely does.