Türkiye Is Not a Superpower. It Is a Regional Middle Power Under Strain

By Murat YILDIZ

Murat YILDIZ is an investigative journalist and Editor-in-Chief at Bosphorus News. The author covers Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics, security, defense and energy.

Speaking at Oxford University in April 2026, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said the line between regional and global crises had "truly disappeared" and that middle powers were gaining strategic weight in the new international order. He was, in effect, describing Türkiye.

There is truth in that description. Türkiye is more active, more militarily capable and more diplomatically visible than it was two decades ago. It builds drones, operates overseas bases, mediates between adversaries and has placed itself inside almost every major security file around its borders, from the Black Sea and Syria to Libya, Somalia and the Eastern Mediterranean.

But that profile does not make Türkiye a superpower. It points to something more precise: an ambitious regional middle power pushing hard against the limits of its own economic, technological and institutional base.

The "Turkish Century" narrative promises a higher category. The record shows a country with real leverage, but also real ceilings.

Middle Power Is Not a Consolation Prize

In international relations, middle powers sit between the great powers and smaller states. They do not write the rules of the global system on their own. They do not have reserve currencies, permanent worldwide basing networks or the capacity to sustain pressure across every theatre at once.

Their influence comes from narrower advantages: geography, mediation, selective military capacity, alliance leverage, regional access and the ability to matter in crises where larger powers need partners.

The classical examples were Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and the Nordic states, whose influence rested on multilateralism, international law and institutional credibility.

Türkiye belongs to a different category. Ankara's middle power behaviour is security-driven, military-heavy and deeply geopolitical. It seeks influence through presence, pressure, bargaining power and access to contested spaces.

That has worked in some theatres. It has also created a foreign policy footprint larger than the foundations beneath it.

From Restraint to Forward Presence

The Turkish Republic's early foreign policy was shaped by Atatürk's phrase, "Peace at home, peace in the world." For decades, that meant caution. Türkiye stayed out of the Second World War, avoided major military entanglements beyond its borders and placed its security inside NATO after 1952.

That posture began to loosen in the 1990s, especially under the pressure of the Kurdish insurgency and the strategic opening created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the 2010s, the change became much sharper.

By the mid-2020s, Türkiye had a military footprint in northern Syria, continuous cross-border operations in northern Iraq, its largest overseas base in Mogadishu, forces in Libya and roles in NATO missions in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This is not symbolic activism. Ankara secured buffer zones in Syria, hit Kurdish militant infrastructure in Iraq, built a long-term presence in Somalia and became indispensable in Libya's conflict architecture.

The question is no longer whether Türkiye has reach. It does. The harder question is whether the state has enough economic, technological and institutional depth to sustain that reach without overextension.

Energy Is the First Ceiling

No state that imports most of its energy enjoys full strategic autonomy.

Türkiye imports roughly 70 to 75 percent of its primary energy. Its annual energy import bill runs around 65 billion dollars. A ten-dollar rise in oil prices can add an estimated 4.5 to 5 billion dollars to the current account deficit.

The structure of that dependence matters. Gas comes from Russia through TurkStream and Blue Stream, from Azerbaijan through TANAP and from Iran. Oil comes from Iraq, Russia and Gulf producers. Akkuyu, the country's largest nuclear energy project, is financed, built and operated by Russia's Rosatom under a build-own-operate model.

That leaves Ankara in a difficult position: claiming strategic autonomy while relying on Russia for nuclear infrastructure, Iran for pipeline gas, Gulf markets for oil and imported energy prices for current account stability.

The Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea may reduce part of the pressure. Revised reserves of 710 billion cubic metres and a production target of 40 million cubic metres per day by 2028 give Ankara a serious domestic resource story. Even under an optimistic scenario, however, Sakarya covers only part of national consumption.

The energy gap will narrow before it disappears. It will not disappear in this decade.

The Economy Behind the Flag

Strategic ambition is expensive. Troops abroad, naval operations, intelligence networks, defence projects, diplomacy, reconstruction contracts and industrial policy all require economic depth.

Türkiye's economy has not provided that depth consistently.

The lira lost more than 80 percent of its value against the dollar between 2018 and 2024. Inflation peaked above 85 percent in 2022 and remained high through 2025. The current account deficit still requires external financing, leaving Ankara exposed to global capital flows and shifts in investor sentiment.

The OECD's 2025 Economic Survey of Türkiye projected headline inflation at 34.5 percent in 2025 and 20.8 percent in 2026, far above the OECD average. The central bank's policy rate stood at 46 percent in April 2025, the highest in the G20. The fiscal deficit reached 4.9 percent of GDP in 2024.

The same report pointed to weakening foreign direct investment, a large income gap with OECD countries and the need for a more stable and predictable regulatory framework.

Short bursts of growth can support activism. Superpower capacity requires something more durable: currency credibility, capital depth, predictable rules and an economy that can fund power without repeatedly importing fragility.

The Lira Problem Inside Defence Spending

Türkiye's military spending reached 30 billion dollars in 2025, according to SIPRI. That is a serious commitment and a major increase compared with 2016.

The headline figure still hides a problem.

Defence budgets may be approved in lira, but much of the high-end procurement environment is priced in dollars and euros. Imported components, licensed systems, engines, sensors, electronics and long-term contracts all become more expensive when the currency weakens.

A budget can rise in nominal terms while hard-currency purchasing power remains under pressure. For a country trying to build advanced aircraft, air defence networks, naval systems and long-range missiles, this is not a technical accounting issue. It shapes what can actually be bought, built and sustained.

The Defence Industry Has Moved Fast, but Not Far Enough

Türkiye's defence industry deserves serious treatment. The Bayraktar TB2 changed battlefield calculations in more than one conflict. The Akıncı and TB3 expanded the unmanned systems portfolio. KAAN, Hürjet, Bora and new loitering munitions point to a much more ambitious industrial base than Türkiye had two decades ago.

Yet the core vulnerability remains.

Advanced platforms still depend, in key areas, on foreign inputs. Engines are the clearest example. KAAN has used General Electric F110 engines while Türkiye works toward a domestic alternative. Sensors, avionics, electronic warfare systems and precision components still involve imported or foreign-controlled technologies in several programmes.

Export restrictions have already shown how exposed this model can be. Canadian limits on drone components, the F-35 exclusion after the S-400 purchase and periodic Western technology-transfer constraints all carried the same message.

Türkiye is no longer just a buyer. It is a serious producer and a sophisticated systems integrator. But the difference between assembling a powerful platform and controlling every critical layer of that platform still matters.

An airframe without a fully sovereign engine is progress. It is not strategic autonomy.

NATO Gives Weight and Sets Boundaries

NATO is one of Türkiye's greatest strategic assets. It gives Ankara collective defence guarantees, interoperability, intelligence access and political weight inside the strongest military alliance in the world.

It also marks the boundary of Turkish autonomy.

Türkiye's deterrence against Russia rests not only on its own armed forces, but also on Article 5, NATO's nuclear umbrella and alliance-wide infrastructure. Ankara can bargain inside the alliance, slow decisions, challenge allies and pursue independent procurement. It cannot replace the security architecture that underpins its own deterrence.

The S-400 episode showed the dilemma clearly. Türkiye bought a Russian air defence system despite NATO objections, lost its place in the F-35 programme and faced sanctions exposure. The decision demonstrated autonomy. The consequences showed its cost.

That is the operating space of a middle power: enough room to resist, not enough weight to escape the system entirely.

Montreux Is Both Leverage and Limit

Türkiye's control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles under the 1936 Montreux Convention remains one of its strongest strategic cards.

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ankara invoked Article 19 and closed the straits to warships of the belligerent parties. That limited Russian naval reinforcement from the Mediterranean and also prevented NATO from sending additional warships into the Black Sea.

Türkiye used its gatekeeper role carefully.

But Montreux also limits what Ankara can do. The same convention that gives Türkiye leverage over access to the Black Sea constrains any attempt to reshape the naval balance there unilaterally. Romanian calls for a stronger permanent NATO naval presence run into Montreux's tonnage and duration limits.

Ankara prefers that balance. It has good reasons for doing so. Still, the point remains: one of Türkiye's most powerful instruments is powerful partly because it restricts everyone, including Türkiye itself.

The Aegean Shows the Gap

The Aegean exposes the distance between rhetoric and usable power.

Türkiye operates one of the world's most capable offshore energy fleets, including the Oruç Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa seismic vessels. Ankara maintains that parts of the Eastern Mediterranean fall within its continental shelf claims.

The last major Oruç Reis operation in the Eastern Mediterranean ended in 2021. Since then, Türkiye has not extracted a barrel of oil or a cubic metre of gas from the contested waters at the centre of its maritime argument.

Greece has moved in the opposite direction. It has fortified Aegean islands, advanced its ASPIS defence programme, moved toward F-35 acquisition and deepened defence cooperation with France, Israel and Cyprus.

Erdoğan's September 2022 warning that Türkiye could "come one night without warning" became a defining line of his foreign policy rhetoric. By December 2023, he was in Athens on an official visit and told Kathimerini that the phrase had been misrepresented.

The vessels stayed away from the most contested waters. The drilling did not happen. The slogan travelled further than the operational follow-through.

Presence without production has limits.

Mediation Is Influence, Not Order-Building

Türkiye has shown genuine diplomatic skill.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative mattered. Ukraine-Russia prisoner exchanges showed Ankara's access to both sides. Türkiye's channels with Iran, Russia, Ukraine, Gulf states, Libya's factions and parts of the Syrian file give it diplomatic reach many Western states do not have.

This is one of Ankara's strongest middle power functions. It can talk to actors who refuse to talk to each other. It can host, delay, unblock, mediate and bargain.

But mediation should not be confused with order-building.

Türkiye is useful partly because it is ambiguous. It is neither fully aligned with the Western line nor fully outside it. That ambiguity gives Ankara room to operate. It does not give Ankara the power to impose settlements.

The European Union file shows the ceiling. Türkiye's accession process has been frozen since 2016. Decades of formal engagement have not produced membership, strategic equality or a stable institutional settlement. When European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen grouped Türkiye alongside Russia and China in April 2026 as external influence concerns for Europe, the wording was later softened, but the underlying perception did not come from nowhere.

Türkiye remains central to Europe's security geography. It has not converted that geography into equal political standing.

Institutions Are Part of Power

Superpower status is not built on military capacity alone. Courts, contracts, regulators and property rights matter because they determine whether capital, technology and talent trust the system.

Türkiye's record remains weak on these measures.

The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index places Türkiye near the bottom of global rankings. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index also places it in the lower tier. Judicial independence remains a recurring concern in international assessments.

Foreign direct investment tells the same story. Around 2007 and 2008, Türkiye attracted roughly 22 billion dollars in annual FDI. In recent years, the figure has been closer to 10 to 12 billion dollars.

Poland, another NATO member with significant strategic relevance, has consistently drawn higher levels of FDI. Geography alone does not explain that gap. Institutional confidence does.

Capital goes where rules are reliable. A country that wants strategic autonomy needs capital at scale. Legal credibility is therefore not a domestic footnote. It is part of the power base.

The Talent Leak

Türkiye's population is a strategic asset. More than 85 million people, a relatively young demographic profile, a large labour force and a deep engineering pool all support middle power status.

The problem is retention.

High inflation, currency depreciation, political pressure and institutional uncertainty have pushed many educated Turks to build their futures elsewhere. Engineers, doctors, academics, software developers and technical specialists are increasingly drawn to Europe, North America and the Gulf.

This is not only a social problem. It is a strategic one. A country that educates talent and then loses it helps strengthen the economies it wants to compete with.

Brain drain does not create a sudden crisis. It weakens the base slowly, one graduate, one engineer, one research team at a time.

The Real Gap

Status in international politics is not awarded by speeches. Other states reveal how they see a country through investment, alliance planning, technology sharing, military coordination, market access and threat perception.

By those measures, Türkiye is taken seriously. It is a regional military actor, a NATO contributor, a drone producer, a diplomatic intermediary and a state whose geography cannot be ignored.

It is not treated as a superpower candidate.

The reasons are visible: energy dependence, currency fragility, incomplete defence autonomy, institutional weakness, weak capital attraction and the absence of sustained global power projection.

The "Turkish Century" narrative has domestic political value. It mobilises support, justifies defence spending and presents the current government as the architect of national resurgence. But the foundations of power cannot be spoken into existence.

Türkiye's influence has grown. Its support structure has not grown at the same speed.

What Türkiye Is

Türkiye is an ambitious, militarily active and diplomatically assertive regional middle power.

It has geography, military experience, drone capability, NATO membership, control over the Turkish Straits, a large population and access across rival blocs. These are serious assets.

It also has energy dependence, currency weakness, inflation, foreign financing needs, incomplete defence autonomy, institutional erosion, brain drain, democracy lack and a foreign policy map that now stretches from the Balkans to the Gulf and from the Black Sea to the Horn of Africa.

Those limits do not cancel Türkiye's power. They define how far it can be pushed.

Ankara's problem is not the absence of power. It is the mismatch between the language of power and the foundations needed to sustain it. The Aegean shows the limit of rhetoric. The energy account shows the limit of autonomy. The defence industry shows the limit of technology without full component control. The economy shows the cost of ambition without depth.

Türkiye can remain a serious regional power. It can shape crises, complicate great-power plans, extract concessions and build influence in the spaces around it. But calling that position a superpower does not add weight to it. It only turns the missing foundations into evidence: energy autonomy, economic depth, institutional credibility and full control over critical defence technologies are still not there.

The "Turkish Century" may resonate in domestic politics. International politics is less forgiving. Outside the domestic arena, power is measured by what a state can sustain, not by what it can convince its own public to believe.

Türkiye's century, if it comes, will depend on closing that distance...