Reading the OECD Outlook from Ankara

A global economy holding up, but on thinner ground

The OECD’s December 2025 outlook describes a global economy that has so far avoided a sharp slowdown, yet one operating on increasingly fragile foundations. Global GDP growth is projected to ease from 3.3% in 2024 to 3.2% in 2025 and 2.9% in 2026, before a limited rebound in 2027. Read from Ankara, this is neither a story of imminent relief nor of systemic rupture. It points instead to a narrowing corridor in which external conditions are restrictive and domestic policy coherence becomes the central variable.

Limited tailwinds from a slowing world

Within the OECD, average growth is expected to remain locked in a 1.7–1.8% range through 2026. This matters for Türkiye because its principal export markets, particularly in Europe, are not positioned to generate strong demand impulses. While global activity has been supported by AI-related investment and earlier front-loading in trade, these drivers are geographically concentrated. For Türkiye, a world growing below 3% offers stability, but little momentum.

Trade shifts that reward scale and technology

The structure of global trade is shifting in ways that increasingly reward technology intensity and scale. According to the OECD, AI-enabling goods now account for roughly 15.5% of global merchandise trade, with nearly two-thirds originating in Asia, compared with marginal shares in Europe. Türkiye, whose export profile remains concentrated in mid-technology segments, sits outside this fastest-expanding core. At the same time, effective US import tariffs have risen to around 14%, with the OECD warning that their full impact will be felt through 2026. For Türkiye, this implies not an abrupt external shock, but a steady tightening of competitive conditions through prices, inputs and market access.

Inflation as a point of separation

Inflation remains the clearest line of separation between Türkiye and most OECD economies. While inflation is projected to return close to target levels in the majority of advanced and emerging economies by 2026–27, Türkiye remains among the few economies still experiencing double-digit inflation. This does not frame Türkiye as an outlier in crisis, but it does underline the fragility of recent gains. Global disinflation provides limited insulation. Anchoring expectations remains primarily a domestic task.

Labour markets easing, pressures persisting

Across the OECD, labour demand is cooling and unemployment is drifting toward around 5%, while nominal wage growth is easing. For Türkiye, the significance lies less in the global labour cycle itself than in its interaction with high inflation. As external labour markets soften, global support for income growth weakens, while domestic price pressures continue to test real wage dynamics.

Fiscal space defined by choices

Fiscal signals in the OECD outlook are cautious rather than alarmist. Rising long-term sovereign yields and sustained debt issuance are narrowing fiscal space across economies. The emphasis is not on headline tightening, but on spending reviews, efficiency gains and prioritisation. From Ankara’s perspective, fiscal space is defined less by volume and more by the credibility of choices and the quality of allocation.

Reform as insurance, not acceleration

The OECD notes that potential GDP per capita growth across its members has slowed from around 2.2% in the late 1990s to roughly 1.4% today, reflecting weaker productivity and declining economic dynamism. Its call for regulatory simplification, lower entry barriers in services and better resource allocation resonates directly with Türkiye’s long-standing reform debate. In a world of slower growth and higher uncertainty, reform functions less as a growth accelerator than as insurance against external volatility.

A narrowing margin for inconsistency

Taken together, the outlook places Türkiye in a phase where policy choices no longer come with much margin. As global growth slows, trade conditions tighten and inflation remains elevated at home, inconsistency becomes costly rather than absorbable. External conditions no longer cushion domestic missteps. What lies ahead will be shaped by monetary continuity, fiscal discipline and the credibility of reform, not by the global cycle.