Iran Between the Baton and the Bomb: A Choice Imposed on the People
In the aftermath of mass killings in Iran, many expected Donald Trump to act on what he had promised — that “help is on the way.” Instead, what we are hearing now are rumors of negotiations set to take place on Friday in Istanbul. This comes at a moment when the public atmosphere, both inside Iran and in exile, has been deeply shaped by the emotional shock of massacres and widespread repression in Tehran. At the same time, serious efforts were underway to push the region toward a full-scale war — a war that, in reality, would have done nothing to weaken or dismantle the Islamic Republic.
What unfolded instead reveals a more calculated approach. Despite imposing significant pressure on Tehran, the United States has thus far avoided direct war and has deliberately postponed it. This hesitation is not the result of a lack of military capability, but rather the unpredictable consequences of confrontation with Iran and its network of proxy forces. The risk of regional spillover, given Tehran’s entrenched influence across multiple countries, has been deemed dangerously high — and rightly so.
On the other side, Israel sought to exploit the Islamic Republic’s brutal repression and mass killings to advance its own strategic objectives. In this calculus, the lives of Iranian citizens and the blood spilled in the streets held no real priority. Tel Aviv’s efforts, particularly in the context of developments in Syria, were aimed at igniting a major war through Trump — a war that would decisively alter the regional balance. Notably, deeply ideological, confused, and radical factions within the Islamic Republic itself were not averse to such a confrontation.
Even actors aligned with China and Russia entered the picture, offering promises of advanced electronic warfare capabilities, sophisticated radar systems, air-defense platforms, and fighter jets such as the Su-57. The goal was clear: provoke Trump and, through the ideological machinery surrounding Ali Khamenei, turn Iran into a new “Ukraine” for the United States. In such a scenario, nearly all players stood to gain — except for the United States and the people of Iran.
Yes, all parties — including the regime’s own corrupt, doctrinal, and repressive core — appeared willing to embrace a war. Such a conflict could potentially shatter the regime’s internal deadlock and transform it from a collapsing state into a proxy actor, surviving within the “hell of Iran” while sustaining itself through Chinese and Russian logistical support. Prolonging U.S. entanglement, and even fueling internal fragmentation or civil conflict, would offer clear geopolitical dividends for these actors. The cost, however, would once again be borne by ordinary Iranians — this time not under batons and bullets, but beneath bombs and artillery.
Today, despite persistently high tensions, it appears that Washington has presented Tehran with a stark choice: negotiation and concessions, or an all-out war, potentially involving Israel. The conditions on the table differ little from those of Trump’s first term and remain largely an extension of Mike Pompeo’s twelve demands. The difference now is that Tehran has already begun implementing certain tacit concessions.
From Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s signal in Beirut that Hezbollah’s disarmament is an “internal matter,” to Baghdad’s outreach to Washington via Nouri al-Maliki, and cooperation with Saudi Arabia on negotiations involving the Houthis, Iran has demonstrated serious and calculated retreats. In the nuclear arena, recalling the 2010 Tehran Declaration brokered by Turkey and Brazil, there is growing speculation that Iran may once again agree to export its entire stockpile of enriched uranium in exchange for reactor fuel — an arrangement that previously collapsed due to the absence of U.S. guarantees.
There are also persistent rumors that Tehran might be willing to sacrifice much of its nuclear program in return for guarantees of non-belligerence with Israel. The missile program, however, remains untouchable. The Islamic Republic views it as a matter of existential prestige and has shown no willingness to reduce missile range or warhead capacity.
Reports further suggest that Tehran has floated the idea of initiating gradual normalization with the United States. In exchange, it would seek a covert cessation of hostilities with Israel, sweeping internal structural adjustments, nuclear and energy investments, and the lifting of sanctions. The central question is how Washington will respond — especially now, when the Islamic Republic is arguably in the weakest position of its existence.
The involvement of Arab states, alongside Türkiyey’s active mediation, indicates Ankara’s attempt — much like its role in Syria — to position itself as a counterweight to Israel and to bring Trump back to the negotiating table. The objective appears to be reframing Iran as a “Trump-era deal,” rather than a case defined solely by unconditional defense of Israel. Within this framework, Iran would neither be eliminated nor fully reintegrated, but instead kept marginalized and tightly contained.
Ultimately, negotiations between the Islamic Republic and the United States in Istanbul now seem increasingly plausible. If these talks fail, Washington is unlikely to have any option left other than a comprehensive military strike. While Iran’s conventional military capacity pales in comparison to that of the United States, the consequences of such an attack — in a society already fractured by repression, trauma, and profound mistrust — could prove more catastrophic than all the crimes committed thus far by Khamenei himself. Because just as the ruling regime places no value on its people’s lives, external powers, in the end, rarely do either.